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Transacting Business as a Basis for Venue Over a
Corporafion Under the Anfifrust Laws
One of the most obvious difficulties to be met before an antitrust
statute can offer effective relief to aggrieved parties is the problem
that more often than not the litigants will reside in widely separated
geographic areas. The question of venue then becomes almost as
important as the substantive remedy available. A relief measure
which requires the complainant to travel halfway across a continent
in order to obtain jurisdiction over his antagonist affords little prac-
tical relief. Yet that is exactly the situation which existed under the
Sherman Act. Venue for antitrust suits was limited to districts in
which the defendant resided or could be found.' With the rapid ex-
pansion of large scale manufacturing and the development of national
markets, the eastern producer could sell in western shops, fresh vege-
tables from the southwest could be rushed by rail to middle western
dinner tables, and economic injuries could be inflicted on competition
existing hundreds of miles from any judicial district in which a
defendant resided or could be found.2
In the first days of vigorous enforcement of the Sherman Act the
need for revision became apparent. Too few violators were convicted
while too many escaped unscathed, and it looked as if the act itself
would soon become what the cynical turn-of-the-century businessman
thought it was-a dead letter.3 However, laissez-faire had finally
lost its glamour with the shocking disclosures made by the muckrakers
1. Section 7 of the Sherman Act, as originally enacted, read:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other
person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be un-
lawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States
in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by
him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies
(Sherman Act), ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890). (Emphasis added.)
2. ALLEN, THE GREAT PIERPONT MORGAN 157 (1949); 7 FAULKNER, ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES-THE DECLINE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 154 (1951).
See TARBELL, THE NATIONALIZING OF BUSINESS 91-112 (1936), for a digest of one
aspect of the developing view of the country as a single economic territory-in
this instance, the consolidation of railroads is discussed.
3. ALLEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 219; 7 FAULKNER, op. cit. supra note 2, at
178; TARBELL, op. Cit. s-upra note 2, at 215-19. See also, United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (manufacturing not in interstate commerce and
therefore not subject to federal regulation).
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and the Pujo Committee.4 The public saw the destructive potential of
unbridled competition and clamored for some workable method of
subduing the irresponsible, buccaneer businessman. The result was
the Clayton Amendment5
As finally passed the Clayton Act had broadened the provisions of
the Sherman Act to add an additional, less restricted test of venue
applicable only to corporations: the transaction of business generally.0
The words of the statute, "transacts business," are not, of course,
self-explanatory and necessarily require construction.
Legislative history, the usual starting point for a task such as this,
is singularly devoid of enlightening comment. When the Clayton Act
was first reported out of committeeT the venue provision stated simply
that a corporation need be an "inhabitant" or be "found" (i.e., be
doing business) in the district in which suit was brought.8 In the
course of open debate on the floor of the House, the further proviso
"or has an agent" within the district was added as a test of venueY
After the bill passed the House, as amended, the Senate committee 0
made further changes. It deleted the words "or has an agent" and
substituted therefor the phrase "or transacts any business,"" its only
comment being that, "These sections [sections 10 and 11] relate to
venue and issuance of process arising under the antitrust laws. They
are proposed to be amended in certain respects, as shown on their
face [sic], but the amendments require no special explanation here. -12
The House refused to accept the Senate's changes and a conference
4. See, e.g., JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934); SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE
(1906); TARBELL, HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL CO. (1904). See generally,
REGiER, THE ERA OF THE MUCKEAxERS (1932). The "Pujo Committee" was the
name generally given to the House Committee on Banking and Currency in the
years 1912-13. Its most famous report on the so-called "Money Trust Investiga-
tion" was issued as H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913).
5. 38 Stat. 730 (1914). An act amending the existing antitrust laws passed by
the second session of the Sixty-third Congress.
6. Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a
corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an
inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts
business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district of
which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
38 Stat. 730, 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
7. The original bill, H.R. 15, 567, was assigned to the Committee on the
Judiciary for action. 51 CONG. REc. 6714 (1914).
8. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1914).
9. S. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1914).
10. When introduced in the Senate, the bill was assigned to the Committee on
the Judiciary for study. 51 CoNG. REC. 9929 (1914).
11. S. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1914). (Emphasis added.)
12. S. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1914).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss2/7
TRANSACTING BUSINESS
committee was formed.13 It joined sections 10 and 11 into a new
section 12,1 and deleted the word "any" from the phrase "transacts
any business."' 5 This is the language of the section as finally passed 6
and as currently in effect.' 7
Although the scanty legislative comment on the venue provision
affords little interpretive aid, it seems obvious that the common and
ordinary meaning of the language itself is to govern construction.
Further, the deletion of the word "any" from the transacting business
provision clearly indicates that the business which is transacted must
be substantial or at least of some measurable quantity.
Even though venue is a question of fact, it is the presiding judge
who must rule on it.18 Consequently, the issue is discussed in opinions
to a greater extent than would be true if it were left to a jury, and
there is, therefore, a body of judicial reasoning from which the ap-
plicability of the section to particular situations may be extracted.
By and large courts have construed the provision as it was probably
meant to be construed, but in so doing they have clouded their opinions
by using similar but different terminology 9 without benefit of an
explanation."
Two cases regarding venue over a corporation under the antitrust
laws have received Supreme Court attention. The Eastman Kodak Co.
case2 1 held that the phrase "transacts business" was to be given its
ordinary meaning, qualified by the requirement of substantiality im-
plicit in its wording. Mr. Justice Sanford, speaking for the Court,
stated:
[W]e think it clear that, as applied to suits against corpora-
tions for injuries sustained by violations of the Anti-Trust Act,
its necessary effect was to enlarge the local jurisdiction of the
district courts so as to establish the venue of such a suit not only,
as theretofore, in a district in which the corporation resides or
is "found," but also in any district in which it "transacts busi-
ness"-although neither residing nor "found" therein-in which
case the process may be issued to and served in a district in which
the corporation either resides or is "found"; and, further, that
a corporation is engaged in transacting business in a district,
13. 51 CONG. REC. 14,718, 14,737 (1914).
14. S. Doc. No. 585, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9; H.R. REP. No. 1168, 63rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1914).
15. Ibid.
16. 38 Stat. 730, 740 (1914) (approved by the President on Oct. 15, 1914).
17. 15 U.S.C. 22 (1958).
18. 2 LONGSDORF, FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 375 (1928).
19. E.g. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
20. Ibid.
21. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., supra note 19.
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within the meaning of this section, in such a sense as to establish
the venue of a suit-although not present by agents carrying on
business of such character and in such manner that it is "found"
therein and is amenable to local process,- if in fact, in the or-
dinary and usual sense, it "transacts business" therein of any
substantial character.22
Following Eastman Kodak, the Court in the Scophony Corporation
case 23 noted that, "The practical, everyday business or commercial
concept of doing or carrying on business 'of any substantial character'
became the test of venue. ' ' 24 The effect of Eastman Kodak then, as
stated by the Court, was that:
by substituting practical, business conceptions for the previous
hair-splitting legal technicalities encrusted upon the "found"-
"present"--"carrying-onbusiness" sequence, the Court yielded
to and made effective Congress' remedial purpose.2 5
If "the practical everyday business or commercial concept" is the
equivalent of "ordinary and usual sense," it is clear that the Court
has not altered its earlier decision since Scophony also contains a
requirement that the business transacted be substantial. 0 It is also
clear that these decisions promote the intent of Congress if that intent
was to do away with the traditional concept of doing business with
its rigorous and inflexible tests and to substitute a less restricted basis
for venue.
Admittedly, then, the courts have understood the Congressional
mandate of section 12 and have attempted to apply it broadly. Further,
the very vagueness of the term "transacts business" has allowed the
establishment of pliable standards of conduct to be used in determin-
ing whether or not enough business is being transacted to satisfy the
requirements of the statute. Standards that have been established are
applicable to both civil and criminal cases.27
When the corporation is an inhabitant of,2 8 or is found within a
district,29 of course no problem of standards arises. In addition there
are general venue provisions set out in the judiciary act 3o which may
22. Id. at 372-73.
23. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
24. Id. at 807.
25. Id. at 808.
26. Id. at 807.
27. "Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corpo-
ration .... " 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
28. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958).
29. Ibid.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).
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also apply to such a defendant, obviating any problem of this kind,3'
but these aspects will not be considered here.
The first and primary consideration necessarily is the period during
which business was transacted, as related to the time of the violation.
Scophony32 held that if the defendant had been transacting business
within the district when the alleged violation was committed, venue
would properly lie within that district.33 This certainly seems to be in
accord with the purpose of the statute, for otherwise a corporation
could inflict an injury and retreat, thereby successfully avoiding the
consequences of its action.34 Other cases have held that venue is
proper if the corporation is transacting business within the district
at the time of service of process. 35 This is true even when the alleged
wrong had been committed in some other judicial district. In other
words, a corporation may properly be sued in a district in which the
injury had been committed even though it is not transacting business
there at the time suit is brought, or in a district in which it is trans-
acting business at the time of service of process regardless of whether
or not it was transacting business there at the time of the alleged in-
jury.
Once it has been established that the corporation was present in
some form, at a time which would properly establish venue, considera-
tion is directed toward its conduct to determine whether or not it was
sufficient to qualify as transaction of business. Its conduct is always
considered as a whole36 and is to be measured in terms of substantial-
ity generally, 7 rather than by degrees such as "a large amount of busi-
ness in contradistinction to a small amount of business." 38
31. See generally Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 106 F. Supp.
489 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). (The court held that the general venue provision was
equally as applicable as 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958) for alleged antitrust violations.)
32. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
33. Id, at 808.
34. See Ross-Bart Port Theatre, Inc. v. Eagle Lion Films, Inc., 140 F. Supp.
401 (E.D. Va. 1954).
35. Dairy Indus. Supply Ass'n v. LaBuy, 207 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1953);
Abrams v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); of.
De Golia v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 140 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Cal.
1953). (The case held that in cases involving a charge of conspiracy in violating
the antitrust laws, if the charge was subsequently proven and further if it was
proven that at least one of the conspirators was transacting business within the
judicial district, all of the co-conspirators would also be deemed to have done so.)
36. Riss & Co. v. Association of Am. R.R., 24 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 1959); Metro-
politan Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 391 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) ; Abrams v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc., supra note 35.
37. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948); East-
man Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
38. Katz Drug Co. v. W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 6 F. Supp. 210, 212 (W.D. Mo.
1982).
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Since no single activity is usually sufficient in and of itself to satisfy
the transacting business requirement in the doubtful cases, many
activities and many factors must be weighed and balanced. These are,
however, qualitative rather than quantitative: they are not simply
assigned arithmetic values to be totalled and averaged, but are viewed
in the aggregate to determine the substantiality of the activities as a
whole.30
In Abrams v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc.,40 for example, the
court noted that defendant maintained two bank accounts within the
district, that its district sales manager was present there two or three
times a month, that its field service supervisor had conducted a five-
day training course there, that executives of the company held con-
ferences there, that it advertised extensively within the district, and
that three of its five directors resided there. This case is typical of the
tendency to view the conduct of the defendant as a whole and not as
isolated bits and pieces.41
Various activities which have been examined in this connection
include sales, deliveries, the presence of subsidiaries, distributors,
branch offices, the possession of a license to do business, solicitation of
customers and advertising generally. Although any one of these
activities, if engaged in on a large enough scale, may be sufficient to
establish venue, each one is usually considered as a separate item in
the over-all conduct which is the subject of examination.
Sales; Deliveries
When examining sales within a district, either of two tests may be
employed to determine if the substantiality requirement has been met:
(1) the number of customers; or (2) the quantity of goods sold.
A single, isolated sale does not satisfy the requirement; there must
be an element of continuity shown.42 Generally, this means that it
must be demonstrated that sales are made on a recurring basis. 43
When there are grounds for employing the tests, they operate har-
moniously and are complementary in their application. Two cases,
both of them involving mail-order houses, clearly demonstrate this
correlation. In the first,4" only six of over ten thousand customers of
39. See, e.g., Riss & Co. v. Association of Am. R.R., 24 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 1959).
40. 96 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
41. See, e.g., Riss & Co. v. Association of Am. R.R., 24 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 1959).
42. Boston Medical Supply Co. v. Brown & Connolly, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 175
(D. Mass. 1952).
43. One who invokes the jurisdiction of federal courts has the burden of show-
ing he is properly in court: Becker v. Angle, 165 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1947);
Pfeiffer v. United Booking Office, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 363 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
44. Dazian's, Inc. v. Switzer Bros., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 648 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
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defendant resided in the district in which suit was brought. The
court sustained defendant's motion to quash service. Although there
was no statement of the dollar value of sales made to these six, it is
fair to assume from the language of the decision that the amount was
small in absolute terms.
The second case 5 also involved a mail-order house allegedly having
but six customers within the district. However, these customers
purchased over six thousand pounds of ball chewing gum per month,
amounting to annual sales of over $25,000. The court held that venue
was proper, and rightly so, since the total sales were substantial when
viewed from the ordinary businessman's point of view even though
the number of customers was small.
Although cases which require that sales be made on a recurring
basis4" have much to recommend them, the better criterion is sub-
stantiality alone, unclouded by secondary considerations.' 7 Thus, if
the mail-order house in the first case had had a great number of cus-
tomers in the district, each of whom purchased only small quantities
of goods in individual, non-recurring sales, since there is no valid
reason to suppose that Congress did not intend this to amount to a
transaction of business sufficient to establish venue, an aggrieved
customer ought to be allowed to sue such a defendant within that
district. Also, a single sale should, under some circumstances, be
enough to establish venue if it involved a large enough sum of
money.4
Similarly, since every sale necessarily involves a delivery, courts
have sensibly held that deliveries to a district other than the one in
which the sale was made may satisfy the venue requirements.4 9 But
still the test of substantiality must be met. When applied to the situa-
tion of delivery alone, however, substantiality could mean something
altogether different than it does in the sales alone situation, and in
fact is calculated differently. Two separate measurements have devel-
oped for use in delivery cases: (1) the absolute value of the goods
delivered in terms of money ;59 and (2) the relative value of the goods
45. Green v. United States Chewing Gum Mfg. Co., 224 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.
1955).
46. Boston Medical Supply Co. v. Brown & Connolly, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 175
(D. Mass. 1952).
47. Ibid. The defendant had sold to the plaintiff only about $3,000 worth of
merchandise.
48. See, e.g., Mandel Bros., Inc. v. Henry A. O'Neil, Inc., 69 F.2d 452 (1934)
(single sale amounted to "doing business"); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
CONFLICT OF LAws § 167, comment a (1958).
49. See, e.g., Sunbury Wire Rope Mfg. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 129 F.
Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
50. Ibid.
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delivered in terms of money as compared to the dollar value of the
sales of the business as a whole."
Logically, there is no real reason to apply different tests to a delivery
than are applied to a sale. Since a delivery alone is sufficient to estab-
lish venue if the merchandise shipped is "substantial" in amount, and
since the only way in which sales contracts may be completed is by
delivery,52 the same rules should apply to both situations. To date, no
case has attempted to apply the tests used in delivery cases to a sale
alone, nor has a test used in the sales cases been decisive in a delivery
alone situation, but it seems likely that eventually the two situations
will be treated alike.
Nevertheless, while different methods of measuring substantiality
remain, they must be recognized and, assuming that they may soon be
adapted to all cases of sale or delivery, they must be clarified as much
as possible. Essentially, two factors must be considered, either one of
which may control: first, the number of customers dealt with within
the district;53 second, the quantity of the goods sold or delivered.
When measuring quantity, however, any one of several methods may
be employed. First, it may be measured in absolute terms, either in
money54 or by mass (e.g., tonnage) .5 Then, if measured by mass, the
51. Austad v. United States Steel Corp., 141 F. Supp. 437 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
52. Sunbury Wire Rope Mfg. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 129 F. Supp. 425
(E.D. Pa. 1955).
53. Green v. United States Chewing Gum Co., 224 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1955);
Boston Medical Supply Co. v. Brown & Connolly, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 175 (D. Mass.
1952); Dazian's v. Switzer Bros., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 648 (N.D. Ohio 1951);
Abrams v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Lechler
Labs., Inc. v. Duart Mfg. Co., 35 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). Upon analysis
of the cases on this point it appears that the number of customers with which a
corporation deals is the weakest criterion to use in determining if the corporation
is transacting business.
54. Brandt v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 278 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1960) (Defend-
ant A had sales within the district of $1,313,947; defendant B had sales of over
$446,000 and defendant C had sales of over $142,000, and in the case of all three,
the sales shown were substantial.); Green v. United States Chewing Gum Co.,
supra note 53 (Defendant had sales of over $25,000 annually, the amount shown
was substantial enough to say that the defendant transacted business.) ; Reid v.
University of Minn., 107 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (Total sales over the
years of only $6,439 showed that the business conducted within the district was
insubstantial.); Boston Medical Supply Co. v. Brown & Connolly, supra note 53
(Defendant's sale in the case amounted to only $3,000, which was clearly insub-
stantial within the terms of 15 U.S.C. § 22.); Hansen Packing Co. v. Armour &
Co., 16 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (A showing of over $4,000,000 of sales per
year was substantial.).
55. Austad v. United States Steel Corp., 141 F. Supp. 437 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
(Delivery of less than 300 tons of steel during the year to any purchaser in the
district was so insubstantial as to be able to say that the defendant was not
transacting business.)
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volume may be viewed either from within 6 or without 57 the context
of the industry. That is, it may be viewed absolutely, apart from any
considerations of type of article, quantity ordinarily sold, or volume
consumed or produced by the industry or its customers as a whole.
Or, it may be viewed relatively to the facts of economic life within the
industry of which it is a part. Viewed in a vacuum, absolutely, quan-
tity becomes a matter of observation, subject to objective considera-
tions only, and this approach would certainly seem in conformity with
an intent to simplify the test for venue as much as possible. On the
other hand, such a mechanical approach is unrealistic in a highly
complicated industrial society and may work more injustice than it
cures. The ultimate decision must be one of policy and is more prop-
erly within the realm of the legislature than of the judiciary.
56. Austad v. United States Steel Corp., supra note 55. (The ordinary and com-
mon man standard of the industry was the guide to be used by the court.) Many
cases have discussed the defendant's contention of its relatively low percentage of
sales, or deliveries within a district. The courts have always when possible reduced
the relative figures to absolute quantities. Brandt v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 278
F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1960) (Defendants contended that since their sales were only
1.72%, .7% and 1.5% respectively for A, B, and C that that proved the sales were
not substantial. The court rejected their contention and the result was based on
the absolute dollar volume of their sales. See note 54, supra) ; Austad v. United
States Steel Corp., supra (Defendant claimed its transaction of business was
small since only 6/100 of 1% of its production was delivered into the district. The
court reduced this to 300 tons, and decided that the amount was insubstantial. See
note 55, supra); United States v. Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Pa. 1949) (Court
held that since an agent was present in the district who transacted 3.8% of the
defendant's business and that this 3.8% represented over 80% of the business
from the district, that that would be sufficient to allow venue. The basis of the
case is obscure, but probably the court was never presented with the absolute
quantities involved, hence could not decide on the aforementioned basis.) ; Hansen
Packing Co. v. Armour & Co., 16 F.2d 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (Defendant claimed
its sales were insubstantial within the district, because the sales within the dis-
trict were only 2.49% of its sales. The court said that the sales amounted to over
$4,000,000 with the result that the court held the defendant subject to venue.).
57. Metropolitan Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 391
(S.D.N.Y. 1954). (Court held that the test to be applied was the practical every-
day view of the aggregate within the district. Presumably the court meant not
necessarily within the context of the industry.)
58. See generally, Green v. United States Chewing Gum Mfg. Co., 224 F.2d
369, at 371-72 (5th Cir. 1955), where the court said:
It will not do to deny substantially [sic] by replying, as said defendant
does in its President's affidavit, that " * * the gross business of U.S. Chew-
ing Gum Mfg. Co. * * * represented by shipments to these two customers
* ** is a very small part of the total business of my company," for if that
were the rule, we would have different tests of substantiality applying to
different corporations according to their size; a large corporation could, with
impunity, engage in the same acts which would subject a smaller corpora-
tion to jurisdiction and venue.
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One further observation should be made regarding sales. When the
sale is of a service which is to be performed in interstate commerce,
the plaintiff faces an additional burden in terms of proof: he must
show that some portion of the service is to be performed within the
judicial district in which he is seeking to establish venue., Once hav-
ing shown this, he is no longer subject to the objection that his action
unduly burdens interstate commerce. Although no case has specifi-
cally held that the quantum of service to be performed must be sub-
stantial, this would seem to follow naturally.
Subsidiary Corporations
Different problems arise when the business is being transacted
through a subsidiary company. For a long time, the transaction of
business by a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation was insufficient to
establish venue for an action against the parent if the two firms main-
tained their separate corporate identities.61 This general rule was
reversed in the most recent case 1 in which it was discussed. The court
in Waldron v. Britisk Petroleum Co.62 placed great reliance upon
the Scophony63 case and held that venue was proper notwithstanding
the maintenance of separate corporate identities by the parent and its
subsidiary. Although the same defendant had been able to escape
59. McManus v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 301 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
Compare Green v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). (The court said
that sales of services in interstate commerce which were not to be used within
the district did not constitute "doing business" sufficient to be a basis of venue;
however, the court said it was obvious that the defendant was doing some busi-
ness.) See also, Boston Medical Supply Co. v. Lea & Febiger, 195 F.2d 853 (lst
Cir. 1952). (The First Circuit said that a consignment for resale contract was
not sufficient to hold that the consignor was transacting business, since to hold
otherwise would be to unduly burden commerce.)
60. Austad v. United States Steel Corp., 141 F. Supp. 437 (N.D. Cal. 1956);
Terry Carpenter, Ltd. v. Ideal Cement Co., 117 F. Supp. 441 (D. Neb. 1954);
Pfeiffer v. United Booking Office, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 363 (N.D. Ill. 1950); Lawlor
v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 10 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1950). The tests that
have been particularly useful in the courts for determining that a parent is trans-
acting business, because its subsidiary is, are: the existence of an agency-Mebeo
Realty Holding Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 340 (D.N.J.
1942); a general commingling of activities-Northern Ky. Tel. Co. v. Southern
Bell Tel. Co., 54 F.2d 107 (E.D. Ky. 1931); rendering of advisory services for
a fee coupled with fact that one made purchases for the other-Exhibitors Serv.
Inc. v. Abbey Rents, 135 F. Supp. 112 (W.D. Mo. 1955); and finally, when a sub-
sidiary's personnel performs services for the parent under the latter's supervi-
sion-Hansen Packing Co. v. Swift & Co. 27 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
61. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
62. Ibid.
63. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
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prosecution in two earlier cases 64 on the ground that the separate
entities precluded the establishment of venue over the parent, the
court felt free to look behind the corporate fiction in search of legiti-
mate business reasons for the use of a subsidiary, and finding none,
held venue proper, pointing out that:
A corporation may be a fiction of the law but there is no reason
to carry the fiction to the extreme of saying that a corporation
which has wholly owned subsidiaries performing services in the
local jurisdiction which ordinarily would be performed by service
employees, or making sales which ordinarily would be made by a
sales department, is in fact not transacting business in that juris-
diction, particularly when the entire corporate set-up of the de-
fendant shows that it is designed to operate to a substantial de-
gree through separate corporate entities responding to the wishes
and directions of the parent and providing the revenues sought
by the parent. We would be exalting fiction over fact if were
were [sic] to conclude that under those circumstances the parent
company was not in fact transacting business in this District
through the instrumentality of its wholly owned subsidiaries.65
The importance of this decision cannot be over-emphasized. Now
that niceties of corporate law and subtleties of organization will not
be allowed to defeat the premise of Scophony6 that Congress intended
to destroy the "hair-splitting legal technicalities encrusted upon the
'found'-'present'-'carrying-on-business' sequence," 67 the myri-
ads of national companies which transact local business through sub-
sidiary corporations can be subjected to full-scale prosecutions at any
level by an aggrieved party in spite of the fact that they are not
physically present within the district. When this rationale is em-
ployed, due process problems are avoided by using the International
Shoe Co. v. Washington"8 rule that "minimum contact" is sufficient
to satisfy the due process requirements of Milliken v. Meyer.6 9
Although the rule has not been applied to any other situation, it is
clearly the most sensible approach to the problem and will no doubt
be followed in subsequent cases, not only because it avoids the tech-
nical difficulties of the older rule70 but also because the premise is
sound and the reasoning logical.
64. Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 70 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1946) (action under the antitrust laws); Amtorg Trading Corp. v.
Standard Oil Co., 47 F. Supp. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (action in admiralty).
65. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp. 830, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
66. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
67. Id. at 808.
68. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
69. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
70. See also United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center
Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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Local Distributors; Local Offices
When a company engages the service of a local firm to act for it,
further complications arise. The typical case is where a manufactur-
ing concern sells its produce through a local distributor. Before the
corporation can be said to be transacting business in that area, it must
be shown either that: (1) the sales or deliveries of its good to the
distributor are substantial ;71 (2) it exercises substantial control over
the distributor through supervision,7 2 or, in areas which do not follow
the Waldron case, (3) the distributor is a subsidiary of the corpora-
tion but that separate identities have not been maintained.73
The reason for holding that the presence of a distributor within a
district will, when coupled with any one of the other requirements
listed above, satisfy the venue requirements is fairly obvious: first of
all, the very existence of the distributor within the district raises an
inference of continuity. Then once it is shown that the corporation's
conduct fits any of the three listed categories, substantiality will be
presumed since the distributor himself is transacting business there.
Maintenance of an office within the district presents different prob-
lems, especially as concerns the time factor. The simplest case was one
in which the defendant corporation had maintained a branch sales
office within the district for over twenty years.7 4 This office was
staffed by eleven sales personnel and seven stenographers, and al-
though the sales contracts were not final until accepted at the com-
pany's home office, over three million dollars of merchandise a year
were sold through it. The court thought that the defendant had really
been "found" within the district, and was certain that it had been
transacting business there under any test which might be applied75
In Dairy Indus. Supply Ass'n v. La Buy,7 the situation was a little
more complicated. The Association, a trade group with over four
hundred members, had its home office in Washington, D.C. When
suit was brought in the Northern District of Illinois, practically the
entire staff of the group was in Chicago at an exposition. The Seventh
Circuit found venue proper since "practically the entire business of
DISA was being transacted in Chicago. '77 Thus even a temporary
sojourn may serve as a basis for establishing venue.
Similarly, the leasing of office space staffed by a single employee,
71. See cases cited in notes 54, 55, 56 & 57 supra.
72. Jeffrey-Nichols Motor Co. v. Hupp Motor Car Corp., 46 F.2d 623 (lst
Cir. 1931).
73. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
74. Haskell v. Aluminum Co. of America, 14 F.2d 864 (D. Mass. 1926).
75. Id. at 869.
76. 207 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1953).
77. Id. at 557.
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"partially, if not largely, for the convenience of its licensees and cus-
tomers"7 and used as a meeting place and conference room for officers
and directors was sufficient evidence to support a finding that a cor-
poration had been transacting business within the district.7 9
As in the distributor cases, then, not much need be shown in order
to convince the courts that business is in fact being transacted when
the defendant has an office within the district. There is a close correl-
ation of reasoning in both situations: continuity and substantiality
can safely be presumed.
Local Licenses
Another situation in which the elements appear from the facts
alone is the case in which the defendant holds a license from some
local governmental authority to do business in that area. It is clear
that this will subject the corporation to suit6 -- including an action
for alleged violation of antitrust laws-under the judiciary act now
in force.81
A recent decision which discusses this type of case from the trans-
acting business point of view involved three corporations, all national
liquor distributors which had obtained liquor licenses from the state
of Missouri in order to sell to local wholesalers.82 The court held that
the license and subsequent actions in accordance with its provisions
pro tanto constituted the transaction of business. 83 The license and
compliance with its terms were "not to be considered in isolation."8 4
Thus, the possession of a license amounts to irrebuttable proof that
business is being transacted. This being the case, it might be that an
unretracted registration to do business, for example, without any-
thing more and without a showing that any business was actually
done, could amount to an admission by the defendant sufficient to
establish venue. As far as burden of proof and need for substantiat-
ing evidence are concerned, license cases are the easiest of all for the
plaintiff.
Solicitation and Advertising
When the only action being done by a defendant is the solicitation of
business, the rule generally is that local courts have no jurisdiction
78. Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 70 F. Supp. 77, 84
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
79. Winkler-Koch Eng'r Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 70 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
80. See note 31 supra.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).
82. Brandt v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 278 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1960).
83. Id. at 910.
84. Ibid.
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over him. 5 Nevertheless, mere solicitation has been held to be suffi-
cient to establish venue under the transacting business clause of the
Clayton Act86 However, the method used in the solicitation can be
extremely important. For instance, a cooperative corporation which
solicited members by advertising only and made no personal canvass
was held to be exempt from suit in the district in which the advertis-
ing was circulated. 7 Also, a non-profit corporation which published
advertising in its magazine which was circulated within the district
was not subject to venue.8 Since the basis for this decision was that
to hold otherwise would be to place too great a burden on fraternal
and service societies, 8 this case must be limited to its facts, and a
corporation which is neither a fraternal nor a service organization
might be subject to local courts in areas in which it circulates adver-
tising to any great extent.
The fact of advertising alone has never been used in and of itself
to establish venue. Nevertheless, it is clear that advertising is one of
the elements which may properly be considered when viewing a de-
fendant's over-all activities.90
Conclusion
The preceding are the considerations which enter into any decision
on the transacting business issue when raised in antitrust cases. The
clause was added to the venue provisions in order to broaden the bases
on which antitrust actions could be brought, and as interpreted, it
has accomplished quite a bit. From all indications, the trend is to
broaden the net of venue still further, and as the volume of prosecu-
tions for antitrust grievances increases, it is almost certain that other
considerations will take their places among those listed. And that is
the strength of the clause. Although it does present some difficult
problems, it is flexible enough to be useful, it is adaptable to the eco-
nomic situation and it can catch the otherwise uncaught.
85. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) (jurisdic-
tion proper on other grounds).
86. Adolf Meyer, Inc. v. Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 16 F. Supp. 783
(S.D.N.Y. 1936). Cf. United States v. Asbestos Corp., 34 F.2d 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1929).
87. Midwest Fur Producers Ass'n v. Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n, 102 F.
Supp. 649 (D. Minn. 1951).
88. Wentling v. Popular Science Publishing Co., 176 F. Supp. 652 (M.D. Pa.
1959).
89. Id. at 657.
90. See Wentling v. Popular Science Publishing Co., 176 F. Supp. 652 (M.D. Pa.
1959) ; Brandt v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 278 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1960).
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